Malaysian and Thai tankers have already passed through the Strait of Hormuz. Indonesian vessels, however, remain stuck. What is wrong with Indonesian diplomacy?

This simple question reveals a significant gap in Indonesia’s “free and active” foreign policy. This is not merely about ships — it is about Indonesia’s position on the global stage.

The strait that freezes the world

Since the United States and Israel escalated military actions against Iran on February 28, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz has become the most dangerous point on the global energy map. Data from BBC Verify shows that shipping traffic in the strait fell from 138 vessels per day to fewer than 100. Between March 20 and 22, according to Anadolu Agency, approximately 1,900 ships were reportedly unable to navigate the strait.

This geopolitical crisis has tested the position of every country, including Indonesia.

Iran ultimately did not close the Strait of Hormuz to all countries. Instead, it created a selective list. As of March 26, countries explicitly permitted passage included China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iraq, and Bangladesh.

Iran also stated that ships from “non-hostile countries” would be allowed passage, provided they coordinated with Iranian authorities. While this condition appeared open-ended, it effectively became a test of diplomatic relationships.

However, tankers belonging to Malaysia and Thailand successfully passed through the strait. This is noteworthy because neither country is a major global power, and both are Indonesia’s regional peers in Southeast Asia. This is where the problem becomes evident: Indonesia is neither considered an enemy nor a trusted partner.

Two Indonesian-owned tankers — Pertamina Pride and Gamsunoro, operated by PT Pertamina International Shipping — remained stuck as of the end of March. Their cargo was critical, as Middle Eastern crude oil accounts for 19 percent of Indonesia’s national imports.

When neighboring countries read the map faster

Amid Iran’s selective permit policy, Thailand and Malaysia moved quickly.

Thailand resolved the issue with a direct diplomatic step. Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow personally contacted Iran’s ambassador in Bangkok, Nasereddin Heydari. As a result, a tanker owned by Bangchak Corporation passed through the Strait of Hormuz on March 23. One call. One day. Problem solved.

Malaysia followed a similar approach. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim personally announced that a Malaysian tanker had received permission from Iran. His longstanding personal relationship with Tehran became a valuable diplomatic asset.

Meanwhile, on March 4, Indonesia’s Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Bahlil Lahadalia, stated that negotiations were ongoing regarding the two Indonesian tankers. Nearly a month later, by mid-March 2026, they were still stuck in the Strait of Hormuz.

This comparison, though uncomfortable, is worth examining. It reflects how middle powers navigate great-power rivalry under pressure.

Three meetings, two messages, one strategy

Recognizing that conventional diplomatic channels had stalled, President Prabowo Subianto appeared to take control through an emergency diplomatic maneuver. He moved beyond rigid diplomatic notes and launched a series of unconventional initiatives to repair Indonesia’s bargaining position.

On March 27, 2026 — one day after Iran announced its list of permitted countries — Prabowo held three seemingly unrelated meetings. In reality, these were part of a hedging strategy designed to engage multiple sides simultaneously without favoring any single power.

Prabowo met with China’s Minister of State Security, Chen Yixin, at the State Palace — representing a country with strong communication channels with Tehran. On the same day, he also met Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater Associates and an advisor to Danantara, Indonesia’s new sovereign wealth fund.

Additionally, Prabowo hosted Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim following a phone invitation on March 23. Their two-hour meeting focused on regional coordination to facilitate passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

This represented a multi-track diplomatic effort — opening communication with China, building regional cooperation, and signaling flexibility to Washington.

Prabowo’s actions reflected a practical implementation of Indonesia’s “free and active” foreign policy. He remained open to all major powers, avoided antagonizing any side, and sought to prevent Indonesia from becoming a victim of great-power rivalry.

A quick result

The results came swiftly. On the same day, Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Vahd Nabyl A. Mulachela announced that Iran had responded positively to Indonesia’s request. The two Pertamina tankers, stuck for weeks, finally received clearance to pass.

Prabowo appeared to be playing chess — moving cautiously yet strategically — while maintaining Indonesia’s neutral position between major powers.

A new diplomatic standard?

Looking ahead, this multi-track diplomatic model may become Indonesia’s new standard — combining diplomacy, intelligence, economic engagement, and regional coalitions.

“Free and active” foreign policy is no longer just a doctrine; it is a network that must be cultivated continuously.

The next Hormuz crisis will not wait for Indonesia to be ready. And when it comes, Beijing may not always be available as an intermediary. The next test — likely with higher stakes — will inevitably arrive.

The question remains: Will Indonesia continue waiting for others to move first, or will it finally learn to take the initiative?

Bobby Ciputra Chairman, Indonesian Young Socialist Movement (Angkatan Muda Sosialis Indonesia – AMSI)